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Abstract: Who gets what in portfolio allocation, and how does it matter 
to coalition partners’ legislative support in presidential systems? I pro-
pose that portfolios are not all alike, and that their allocation as well as 
the support for the president’s agenda depends on the particular distribu-
tion of assets within the executive. The portfolio share allocated to coali-
tion parties is weighted by a measure of importance based on the assets 
controlled by the ministry in question, such as policies, offices, and 
budgets. Once the weighted allocation of ministries has been identified, 
the results show that: 1) the president concentrates the most important 
ministries in their own party, mainly considering the policy dimension; 2) 
the positive relationship between portfolio allocation and legislative 
support remains, with the importance of specific dimensions being con-
sidered; and, 3) coalition partners do not respond differently in terms of 
legislative support in light of the different assets’ distribution within the 
portfolio allocation.  
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
Government formation means translating electoral results into executive 
power. Governments may be formed by a single party or by multiparty 
coalitions. If the latter occurs, everything becomes more complex and 
government formation thus becomes a negotiation over who gets what. 
For a long time, the discussion on coalition formation was consid-
ered typical of the literature on parliamentary systems. This was a conse-
quence, first and foremost, of the widespread notion that presidentialism 
and coalitions were incompatible, whether because the president does 
not have incentives to share power or because parties do not have access 
to the main prize, the presidency (Mainwaring 1993). However, when 
comparing different political systems, Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 
(2004) found that multipartism generates cooperation incentives for 
coalition governments in both parliamentary and presidential systems. 
While the institutions are different, the motives for coalition formation 
are similar. Thus it is now necessary to expand the discussion, and to 
thereby understand the incentives that actors have to form coalitions in 
both of these political systems. 
In presidential ones, the president forms coalitions to build legisla-
tive support for their agenda (Amorim Neto 2006). The terms of the 
exchange would be the following: parties commit themselves to support 
the president’s legislative agenda while the president reciprocates by 
distributing ministries for the parties. Coalition government represents 
an equilibrium, because it formalizes the agreement and institutionalizes 
the exchange between actors – thereby overcoming the negative situation 
in which the president negotiates with each legislator individually (Raile, 
Pereira, and Power 2011). From the point of view of coalition partners, 
the deal would be beneficial because controlling ministries means access 
to the executive’s decision-making process – wherein parties can now 
influence policy decisions, budget allocations, and political appointments 
too. 
The goal of this article1 is to evaluate to what degree the terms of 
this agreement are actually honored; that is, how the president allocates 

1  I would like to thank the participants of the Comparative Presidentialism 
course at the University of Oxford, especially Timothy Power and Paul Chaisty 
for their comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the participants 
of the Political Institutions panel of the 10th Meeting of the Brazilian Political 
Science Association (Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política, ABCP) and the 
anonymous reviewers and editors of JPLA for their valuable comments and re-
visions. 
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portfolios and how much this affects legislative support received from 
coalition parties. The analysis of how coalitions actually govern is partic-
ularly important for presidential systems. In this respect, results observed 
therein may differ substantially from in parliamentary ones. First, be-
cause in parliamentary systems proportionality is the rule – something 
very distant from the reality of presidential ones, where the president is 
always the formateur – incentives thus exist to maximize each’s share of 
the prize. Second, because in parliamentary systems once in the coalition 
party support is taken as a given – since the same parties sit in the very 
cabinet where the deal is made. In presidential systems, parliament is also 
a relevant locus where decisions are made (Laver 2006) and, especially in 
Latin America, parties are not always seen as programmatic (Mainwaring 
2001; Nicolau 2006). This means that legislative support for the presi-
dent’s agenda is less predictable (Amorim Neto 2000; Pereira and Rennó 
2003).  
The focus here is on the specific attributes concerning portfolio al-
location, and how this affects the executive–legislative relationship in 
presidential systems. For this, it is assumed that ministries are not all 
alike and that these differences must be evaluated regarding the degree to 
which they reflect the various assets controlled by the executive. I argue 
that the number of ministries alone is not sufficient indication of the 
gains of coalition parties in portfolio allocation. I propose a measure of 
importance based instead on the ministries’ assets, an approach that 
incorporates key policy, budget, and office dimensions. The “policy” one 
refers to the number of legislative initiatives proposed by the ministry; 
“budget” refers to the total and to the investment budget controlled by 
the ministry; and, the “office” dimension refers to the number of discre-
tionary office positions allocated within the ministry.  
These dimensions reflect the main political motivations for gov-
ernment participation: policy, office, and votes. Political parties may seek 
influence over policy, and for this controlling a ministry – with substan-
tial participation in the drafting of legislation – would be relevant. Politi-
cians may also be interested in the office itself, and in the possibility of 
patronage with the appointment of political cronies in the administra-
tion; for this, occupying a ministry with a large number of political ap-
pointment positions would be preferable. Last, political parties may be 
interested in cultivating the electoral support of voters; the use of public 
expenditures and holding a ministry with a massive budget would direct-
ly serve this purpose.  
In sum, politicians may be motivated by policy, office, or votes – 
and portfolio allocation serves all of these desirable ends. However, 
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ministries taken individually do not serve all of these purposes equally at 
the same time. One ministry may be policy relevant while only control-
ling a small budget, and this is why we need to take into account the 
differences in the importance of respective ministries. 
I use a weighted payoff for this importance, to identify the presi-
dent’s decision on who gets what in portfolio allocation and to also ex-
plain the coalition’s support for the executive’s legislative agenda. I revis-
it the traditional argument about the proportionality rule in portfolio 
allocation (Gamson 1961; Amorim Neto 2006), and about the positive 
relationship between portfolio allocation and legislative support (Amo-
rim Neto 2000). The main argument proposed here is that the presi-
dent’s strategy in portfolio allocation and the effect of that portfolio 
share on legislative support varies according to the specific distribution 
of assets within the executive. This happens because of the respective 
incentives that exist for the president and for coalition partners. Regard-
ing the president, the goal is to minimize the risk of policy drift – thus 
concentrating government coordination and policy formulation within 
their own party. From the coalition partners’ point of view, meanwhile, 
they can more easily claim credit for geographically targeted policies than 
for more diffuse governmental ones that would instead be directly at-
tributable to the president. 
From this it is expected that the president will allocate a dispropor-
tionate share of portfolios to co-partisans, especially considering the 
high-value ministries in the policy dimension, and will distribute es-
teemed portfolios per the budget dimension more evenly. Concerning 
legislative support, it is expected that the larger the gain within the ex-
ecutive, the greater the support in the legislature. However, following the 
main argument, this effect is expected to be more acute when it comes to 
the portfolio share weighted by budgetary importance.  
I constructed an original dataset to address these questions with in-
formation regarding the Brazilian case, for the period of 1999–2014. The 
justification for the case study is that it is a starting point for the con-
struction of little-explored measures and innovative tests for hypotheses. 
First, I describe the relative importance of the different ministries. Then, 
I analyze who gets what in portfolio allocation in the current Brazilian 
coalitional presidentialism. Last, I test the effect of portfolio allocation 
on legislative support, using the measure of coalition discipline toward 
the government.  
The main contributions of this article are threefold. First, it is 
shown how presidents distribute portfolios via considerations of the 
different assets that the respective ministries control. To do this, I pre-
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sent a measure of portfolio importance based on objective indicators and 
not survey data, as is usually done in the parliamentary systems literature; 
this reveals that ministries may be valued for different reasons. Second, it 
is demonstrated that coalition partners are not treated equally and that 
the president allocates a disproportionate share of portfolios to co-
partisan ministers. This concentration is especially acute when consider-
ing the policy importance of ministries. Third, I revisit established argu-
ments in the literature and show that the positive relationship between 
portfolio share and coalition discipline holds when we consider the dif-
ferences in importance of the respective ministries.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows: in the next section, I 
present the theoretical framework for the argument and propose a new 
indicator of portfolio importance. This is done to show how presidents 
distribute ministries, and to test the effects of the exact distribution of 
ministries on legislative support. Following on, the empirical data and 
methods are presented. Then the results, and lastly the conclusion.
3RUWIROLR$OORFDWLRQLQ&RDOLWLRQ*RYHUQPHQWV
6KDULQJ3RZHU%XLOGLQJ6XSSRUW
The literature on portfolio allocation in parliamentary systems is ex-
tremely well developed, and can be divided into two approaches: de-
mand-based and proposer-based models (Ansolabehere et al. 2005). 
Demand models are the ones that predict portfolio allocation propor-
tionality based on Gamson’s Law, while proposer ones identify the for-
mateur’s advantage (Rubinstein 1982; Baron and Ferejohn 1989). While 
formal models predict a disproportional gain by the formateur, empirical 
analyses show an impressive proportionality regarding portfolios and 
legislative seats, “one of the highest nontrivial r-squared figures in politi-
cal science (0.93)” (Laver 1998: 4). This is considered the “portfolio allo-
cation paradox” (Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006). 
One of the aspects that may help us to understand the process of 
coalition formation better, and to resolve this disconnect between formal 
models and empirical results, is the features that differentiate ministries – 
or portfolio salience. Ministries are not all alike, and that needs to be 
taken into consideration in proportionality and formateur advantage calcu-
lations. Beyond a whole body of literature that establishes government as 
composed of entirely homogenous parts, where the decision to be made 
is exclusively about the number of ministries that each party will control, 
these models identify differences between ministries – establishing that 
parties have different preferences for different ministries, thus affecting 
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the aggregate gain of coalition partners (Laver and Hunt 1992; Warwick 
and Druckman 2001). 
Regardless of the measure used, once the coalition is formed and 
portfolios have been allocated, legislative support for the government is 
taken as given until internal conflicts cause the deal to be renegotiated. 
This happens because “countries with parliamentary regimes are NOT 
governed by their parliaments, but by executive coalitions supported by 
Parliament” (Laver 2006: 6). Responsible party government is usually 
assumed, and since the cabinet is the decision-making locus, legislators 
need to stay loyal to the various parties if they wish to be a part of the 
government or to keep their own party in the coalition. Therefore, party 
discipline or the supporting of the government’s agenda is not a funda-
mental issue – except when focusing on the amendment of bills (Martin 
and Vanberg 2011) or on the monitoring of coalition partners (Carroll 
and Cox 2012).  
How do these questions over portfolio allocation and legislative 
support develop in presidential systems? Are these coalitions formed in 
the same way, obeying the same calculations, and generating the same 
outcomes? In presidential systems, the head of state and government is 
directly elected and has a fixed term. This has an important implication 
for coalition formation and governance: the president is always the for-
mateur, and that status is defined exogenously with a pre-determined 
duration.  
Since for Gamson (1961) proportionality in portfolio allocation is 
only observed if no participants have veto power or are otherwise man-
datorily included in every possible coalition, proportional allocation is 
not to be expected. This is because “where one member has veto power, 
there is no alternative to his inclusion; he could no longer be expected to 
demand only a proportional share of the payoff” (Gamson 1961: 377). 
For that reason, proportionality would not be observed in presidential 
systems and, according to this rule, this would furthermore not be a 
surprise – rather a direct effect of the institutional design of such re-
gimes.  
Portfolio allocation in presidential systems is centered on the presi-
dent’s strategy of not only building up legislative support but also of 
minimizing the risk of policy drift (Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 
2014). This is because ministries are delegated to coalition partners, but 
the president still has final responsibility for the government. This con-
cern with coalition governance is fundamental, since coalitions in fact 
govern – that is, they formulate policy, allocate the budget, and imple-
ment directives.  
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Another significant difference herein as compared to parliamentary 
systems is in the executive–legislative relationship, where both cabinet 
and parliament are important decision loci (Laver 2006). Also the re-
sponsible party government ideal, usually assumed in parliamentary sys-
tems, is not observed in presidential ones – particularly in Latin America. 
Therefore, the generation of legislative support becomes more complex 
and variable according to the specific context. In this regard, coalition 
formation is only one of the possible explanations – with distributive 
politics being a viable alternative for the president in their endeavors to 
maintain governability in a context of parties that are not very program-
matic and of legislators behaving individualistically.  
Regarding coalition formation and the construction of legislative 
support, Amorim Neto (2000) shows that the more proportional a par-
ty’s gain in the share of ministries, the higher the degree of its adherence 
to the executive’s agenda in parliament. This demonstrates that the nom-
inal status of coalition government alone does not solve all the issues 
with building legislative support in presidential systems. How the portfo-
lio allocation is actually made and how exactly deals are struck are what 
truly matter. 
An alternative option for building legislative support in presidential 
systems is distributing pork in individual vote negotiations (Ames 2003). 
The individualistic nature of political behavior, mainly a consequence of 
the electoral system, makes representatives receptive to this type of strat-
egy given that particularistic spending is associated with better chances 
of electoral success (Pereira and Mueller 2004; Pereira and Rennó 2003). 
Legislative support is constructed in the day-to-day life of the executive–
legislative relationship, without an accompanying institutionalized, long-
term deal. 
Raile, Pereira, and Power (2011) argue in favor of integrating both 
strategies – coalition formation and pork distribution – via what the 
authors call pork goods and coalition goods. These are imperfect substi-
tutes: “Coalition goods establish an exchange baseline, while pork covers 
the ongoing costs of operation” (Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011: 324). 
The president would have a toolbox to deal with parties far from the 
responsible party government ideal observed in parliamentary systems, 
and to maintain governability in a highly fragmented context. 
However, one question remains unanswered: What exactly are “coa-
lition goods”? By opposing pork and coalition goods, the authors – even 
if implicitly – associate the latter with a more ideological concern and the 
former with an electoral interest among the representatives. Nonetheless 
we still know little about what precisely the ministries, which represent 
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the operationalization of these coalition goods, offer to the parties that 
comprise the coalition. That is, we know little about what assets each 
ministry offers, how these benefits are distributed among coalition part-
ners, and how this specific carving up affects legislative support from 
these partners in parliament. 
The ministries represent access to the policy-formulation process in 
the executive. There is a specialization in issues within each ministry, 
such that who controls the ministry oversees also a sizeable number of 
decisions. Normally, who actually runs these organizations has agenda-
setting power in policy propositions – or at least is consulted in their 
formulation. Ministries are also responsible for implementing policies 
and for budget allocation. Thus they may perform several roles in the 
executive’s decision-making processes, from policy formulation to the 
allocation of distributive policies, including appointments in the admin-
istration. Because of this, I propose here an integrated approach to these 
topics – one in which coalition goods, or ministries, are valued by the 
assets that they control. Parties look to integrate the government so as to 
have access to the benefits that a ministry may offer in influence over 
policy, political appointments, and budget distribution. I thus analyze 
systematically which specific assets each ministry controls, to map how 
presidents distribute ministries and how the exact apportioning of these 
affects the coalition’s subsequent legislative support. 
The first step here is to establish that ministries are not all alike; that 
is, they control different assets that can have varying appeals. If minis-
tries are not entirely homogenous, then the parties’ gain is different ac-
cording to which particular ones it is that they control. The second step 
then becomes constructing a measure of importance capable of simulta-
neously capturing the different relevant aspects, objectively and system-
atically, so that results can be tested and potentially replicated in other 
contexts elsewhere too. 
The matter of differences between ministries has already been rea-
sonably explored in parliamentary systems, in the form of salience 
measures. These yardsticks of portfolio salience usually take the form of 
expert surveys, asking questions about the exact value of different cabi-
net positions (Laver and Hunt 1992; Warwick and Druckman 2001, 
2005). These measures have been very useful for testing hypotheses 
about coalition formation and governance. However, they have also 
revealed a number of limitations. First, these are expert surveys – and the 
respondent’s judgment may be contaminated by the portfolio-allocation 
process itself (Browne and Feste 1975; Bucur 2018). Second, these sur-
veys ask very generic questions about the value ascribed to a specific 
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ministry, and thus do not explain why these ministries are valued differ-
ently or indeed the variety of reasons why a particular ministry might be 
important.  
Concerning presidential systems, portfolio salience is a matter of 
discussion and certain a priori classifications. Abranches (1988) argues 
that ministries do not have the same political worth, and may be differ-
entiated into coordination ministries and clientele or spending ministries. 
For Amorim Neto (2000), in the real world of politics not all ministries 
are alike. Moving on to the classifications provided for empirical tests, 
Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) identify ministries as 
having high,2 medium,3 and low4 prestige. The same authors (2009), 
analyzing the career paths of female ministers, also offer a classification 
based on the issue area dealt with. They thus demarcate ministries into 
“feminine policy domain”5 and “masculine policy domain.”6  
Analyzing coalition governance, Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 
(2014) establish a subgroup of “core portfolios” as the ones central to 
the government’s sound functioning. Explaining ministerial turnover, 
Camerlo and Perez-Linan (2015), meanwhile, classify ministries into 
categories of “policy” (ministers in charge of macroeconomic manage-
ment and specific policy areas such as education, health, and labor), 
“politics” (ministries engaged in domestic politics such as the Ministry of 
the Interior and the Ministry of the Presidency), and “external” (minis-
tries engaged in international issues such as foreign affairs and defense). 
Even though researchers usually agree that cabinet positions are not all 
alike and present some a priori classifications for them, to the best of my 
knowledge there have been no attempts to date to measure portfolio 
salience systematically and objectively within presidential systems. I pro-

2  Defense and Public Security, Finance and Economy, Foreign Affairs, and 
Government/Interior. 
3  Agriculture, Fisheries, and Livestock, Construction and Public Works, Educa-
tion, Environment and Natural Resources, Health and Social Welfare, Industry 
and Commerce, Justice, Labor, Transportation, Communications, Information, 
and Planning and Development.  
4  Children and Family, Culture, Reform of State, Temporary and Transient 
Ministries, Science and Technology, Sports, Tourism, and Women’s Affairs.  
5  Children and Family, Culture, Education, Health and Social Welfare, and 
Women’s Affairs.  
6  Agriculture, Fisheries, and Livestock, Construction and Public Works, Defense 
and Public Security, Finance and Economy, Foreign Affairs, Government/In-
terior, Industry and Commerce, Labor, Science and Technology, Transporta-
tion, Communications, Information, Environment and Natural Resources, Jus-
tice, Planning, Sports, and Tourism.  
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pose such a measure now being undertaken, that based on observable 
indicators.  
Such indicators are useful for two reasons: First, they are objective, 
transparent, comparable across time, and replicable in different contexts. 
Second, objective indicators show that ministries can be important for 
varying reasons when compared across different dimensions. To de-
scribe the difference in importance between ministries, I explore the 
three core drivers that motivate political actors vying for electoral suc-
cess: influence over policy, political appointments, and budget allocation 
respectively.  
The choice of these variables is loosely guided by the argument that 
political parties facing hard choices make decisions, as noted earlier, 
based on three primary considerations: policy, office, and votes (Strøm 
and Müller 1999). I argue that political actors will consider these three 
factors when facing a decision about which ministries to control, and 
that these drivers can be translated as in effect being the different assets 
that a ministry holds. The policy driver can be seen as having influence 
over the policy-formulation process, precisely through participation in 
the drafting of policy initiatives in the executive. The office driver can be 
seen as control over political appointments, which can be used to award 
political allies and also as patronage. Last, the votes driver can be seen as 
having control of a large budget, which can be used to target voters in 
personalistic elections – such as the ones held with an open-list propor-
tional representation rule.  
With these measures of portfolio importance in hand, it will be pos-
sible to provide more precise answers to certain fundamental questions 
related to portfolio allocation. I argue that the president takes into con-
sideration the governance implications of this portfolio allocation. These 
ramifications underpin both the construction of legislative support and 
also the risk of policy drift. Both the president and coalition partners 
seek influence over governmental decisions. However, the institutional 
design of presidential systems makes the incentives for the president and 
coalition partners differ. The president is the only representative elected 
in a national district. Also, the personalization of politics in presidential 
systems makes the president identifiable as the responsible person for 
national politics as well as for national-level outcomes. Despite the mul-
tipartisan nature of coalition governments, in presidential systems the 
president will remain the primary responsible individual for governmen-
tal decisions. For this reason, the president will have incentives to con-
centrate a disproportionate share of ministries within their party, ap-
pointing co-partisan ministers, as a way to keep decisions under control. 
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This effect is especially acute when we consider the most important 
ministries concerning policy formulation.  
From coalition partners’ point of view, they are not directly respon-
sible for governmental decisions since there is no binding agreement in 
government formation in presidential systems similar to the ones cele-
brated in parliamentary systems. Considering that coalition partners 
might find it challenging to claim credit for national policy, and taking 
into account also the incentives of an electoral system that brings to 
power legislators with an open-list proportional mode of rule, we can 
expect that coalition partners will be more interested in distributive poli-
cies. This would happen because coalition partners can now claim credit 
for policies with a concentrated geographical impact that can further-
more be attributed to a coalition partner, and not to either the govern-
ment as a whole or to the president individually. The reasoning behind 
this argument is the same as that presented in the literature on distribu-
tive politics within legislatures. 
I revisit the traditional argument on the proportionality rule (Gam-
son 1961; Amorim Neto 2006) by proposing that presidents will have 
incentives to allocate a disproportionate share of ministries to loyal min-
isters. This will be expressed in the mode of a “formateur advantage.” 
However, considering that these ministries are not all alike, I expect that 
this concentration will be more pronounced when the policy relevance 
of the ministries is considered. On the other side, we expect that the 
president will reward coalition partners with the ministries that they are 
more directly interested in – namely the more important ones concerning 
the budget dimension, since these resources can be used to gain electoral 
advantages. From all of this I formulate the following hypotheses:

H1: Presidents will allocate the largest share of portfolios 
to co-partisan ministers as compared to coalition partners. 
H2: The effect of co-partisanship will be greater consider-
ing the policy-weighted share of portfolios.  
H3: The effect of co-partisanship will be smaller consider-
ing the budget-weighted share of portfolios. 
 
These hypotheses concern the who gets what question, and show how 
the specific assets that a ministry controls are relevant to the portfolio-
allocation game. However, coalition politics in presidential systems do 
not end with portfolio allocation. Because of the separation of powers, 
coalition parties have enough autonomy in the legislative arena to react 
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to these deals made in the executive. For this reason, I revisit the debate 
on the relationship between portfolio allocation and coalition partners’ 
legislative support.  
The expected positive effect of portfolio allocation on legislative 
support has long been established, and indeed empirically tested (Amo-
rim Neto 2000). The larger the gain, the greater the legislative support. 
However, this empirical association, despite its consistency, is perpetually 
accompanied by an important question: What would happen to the re-
sults if the differences between ministries were considered? It is ex-
pected, even considering the different facets controlled by the ministries, 
that the greater the share of portfolios controlled by the party, the larger 
the subsequent payback – in the form of legislative support for the pres-
ident’s agenda. This hypothesis means that the coalition agreement 
works with both sides on delivering what was promised.  
 
H4: The larger the weighted share of portfolios, the greater 
the legislative support for the president’s agenda.  
 
However, it is also expected that the different dimensions of portfolio 
importance will matter in the calculations. I anticipate that the effect of 
portfolio allocation on legislative support will be larger when the portfo-
lio share is weighted by its budgetary importance. This follows the rea-
soning that when coalition partners control ministries with significant 
participation in the federal budget, they would be able to extract rents 
from government participation and would reciprocate by supporting the 
president’s legislative agenda. This hypothesis is meant to compare the 
effect of different assets’ distribution on coalition support. 
  
H5: The effect of the budget-weighted share of portfolios 
on legislative support for the president’s agenda is greater 
than the other dimensions’ effects.  
 
Technically, H1 and H4 mean a simple effect. H2, H3, and H5 are perti-
nent in comparing the difference between coefficients of the policy, 
office, and budget dimensions of portfolio importance. I also consider as 
relevant certain factors that explain legislative behavior: ideological prox-
imity, the electoral cycle, the term of office, and the president’s populari-
ty. It is expected that the greater the ideological distance between the 
coalition party and the president, the weaker the support for the presi-
dent’s agenda. Also, the closer to the end of the term it is, the less sup-
port there will be for the president’s agenda; and, when the president is 
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in their second term, there will also be weaker support for their agenda. 
Finally, the higher the popularity of the president, the greater the legisla-
tive support that they enjoy. The next section presents a specific case 
study, the relevant data, and the research techniques used.
&DVH'DWDDQG0HWKRGV
To test the five introduced hypotheses, I propose the analysis of a par-
ticular case study. I believe that such a study is an important first step 
toward addressing as yet unexplored questions, prioritizing their validity 
– considering that data limitations may thwart the validating of new 
hypotheses, and the constructions of new empirical measures from a 
comparative perspective. 
The article’s goal is to build further knowledge on political systems 
characterized by multiparty presidentialism. In the Latin American con-
text, presidential systems vary greatly when it comes to multiparty gov-
ernment formation. In Brazil, Chile, and Colombia all cabinets have 
hitherto been multiparty ones. For an article that explores portfolio allo-
cation in a multiparty context, an extended period of coalition govern-
ments’ rule and variability in the composition of these are desirable char-
acteristics. For these reasons, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia would be the 
natural candidates for a case study. Among these three cases, from a 
theoretical standpoint, the Brazilian one may be considered extreme 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008). Coalitions in Brazil have an average of 7.5 
parties, a figure much higher than the ones observed in Chile (4.00) and 
Colombia (4.00) respectively (Freudenreich 2016). On this basis, Brazil 
was chosen as the case study as a way of exploring this pronounced 
variability in coalition formation. 
The period analyzed is 1999–2014. These years encompass the ad-
ministration of three separate presidents and four terms, including heads 
of state from distinctly different ideological leanings. The article, as not-
ed, addresses the two research questions of who gets what and how does 
it matter. For this reason, there are two sets of dependent variables and 
accompanying analysis here. 
To answer the question of who gets what, the dependent variables 
are the distribution of ministries weighted by three yardsticks of im-
portance. I measure the significance of the ministries with the following 
variables then: policy, office, and budget. The policy dimension is seen as 
the ministry’s participation in the formulation of the executive’s legisla-
tive agenda, measured as the number of legislative initiatives authored by 
the ministry in question in a particular year. The office dimension is 
  112 Mariana Batista 

identified as the number of positions to be filled by appointment, in 
Brazil referred to as High-level Management and Advising (Direção e 
Assessoramento Superiores, DAS), within the ministry in a particular 
year. The source for this data is the Ministry of Planning. The budget 
dimension is taken as the ministry’s total budget as well as also their 
investment budget for the year. The latter is included because it is the 
part of the budget that is used for distributive politics. The data for this 
is taken from the Financial Administration Integrated System (Sistema 
Integrado de Administração Financeira, SIAFI). 
An important question concerning these variables is whether they 
are attributes of the ministry itself or rather only of specific ministers. I 
argue that these are in fact structural facets of the ministry, and not 
completely subject to the variation ensuing from the particular minister 
currently appointed to the job. To explain this point using concrete ex-
amples, I would contend that the Ministries of Planning, Finance, and 
Justice are structurally important policywise. These are coordination 
ministries that are thus not relevant to budget allocation. This structural 
component states that these ministries will not suddenly become irrele-
vant in the policy dimension because of a change of minister at the helm.  
The logic is that the president observes the a priori characteristics of 
the ministry and then appoints a minister according to the needs of the 
job, and not the other way around. To use another example, the Minis-
tries of Local Affairs and National Integration are budget-relevant ones 
and not especially important with regard to policy formulation; this will 
not change with the appointing of a different head minister. Empirically, 
this can be seen by observing the confidence intervals of the respective 
measures. These do not vary that much, showing that even though there 
is a lot of ministerial turnover the importance of the bodies themselves 
remains relatively stable.7  
The goal here is to explore the relative gains of different coalition 
parties, when considering the importance of the ministries across differ-
ent dimensions. To do this, I present separate regression models – each 
one with a measure of portfolio share weighted by importance. However 
ministries control policy, office, and budget assets simultaneously, while 
they are each analyzed separately here. To take into consideration this 
compositional nature of the data, I use a seemingly unrelated regression 
system. This approach is a particularly appropriate one when considering 
sets of dependent variables that show a contemporaneous correlation of 

7  Means and confidence intervals for the policy, office, and budget measures can 
be seen in Figure 1 below.  
  Portfolio Allocation and Coalition Support in Brazil 113 

errors, such as the importance-weighted portfolio shares used here 
(Philips, Rutherford, and Whitten 2016). The system solves this problem 
by assuming that the error terms are correlated across the different equa-
tions.8  
The core idea behind this is that the president will concentrate the 
largest share of portfolios within their party, by appointing co-partisan 
ministers (in this article I consider nonpartisans as co-partisans of the 
president, since these ministers are expected to be loyal to the president). 
Also, I expect that this effect will be larger when we consider portfolio 
share weighted by policy importance. On the other hand, I anticipate 
that this effect will be smaller when considering the portfolio share as 
weighted by its budgetary importance. Summing up, the president will 
keep control of the largest share of portfolios but will be more willing to 
share the budget-important ministries with coalition partners. In these 
models, the status of being a member of the president’s party or of being 
counted as other coalition partners is used as the leading independent 
variable. I also include the legislative seat share of the coalition parties as 
a predictor of portfolio share in the various models. Data comes from 
the Chamber of Deputies website.  
For the second research question, how does it matter, my hypothe-
ses concern the effects of portfolio allocation on coalition discipline 
when considering these different attributes. For this reason, the 
measures of portfolio share become the leading independent variables 
here. The dependent variable is measured as the coalition parties’ adher-
ence to the stipulations of the government’s leader in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Legislators cast their votes in roll calls. They are considered 
aligned with the government when they vote according to the position 
indicated by the government leader himself/herself. Party discipline is 
thus the aggregation of these individual votes in the form of a discipline 
rate. The data is observed by party and year, and the source for it is the 
Cebrap’s Legislative Database (Figueiredo and Limongi 2001). 
The analyses are divided into three parts: first, I describe each min-
istry’s measure of importance, and then present their exact distribution 
among the coalition parties – thereby answering the who gets what ques-
tion. Then, second, I utilize the importance measures as independent 
variables, analyzing their effect on the coalition’s discipline. As control 
variables, I include the electoral cycle (number of years until the next 
election), the term of office (zero for the first term and one for the sec-
ond), popularity, and ideology. Ideology is measured with data taken 

8  I present the simple OLS models in the Appendix.  
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from a survey with legislators presented by Power and Zucco (2009). 
Popularity is measured as the mean yearly approval of the president 
(percentage of positive ratings); data for this comes from Carlin et al. 
(2016). 
5HVXOWV
First, I outline the relative importance of ministries in Brazil accordingly 
to the policy, office, and budget dimensions introduced earlier. Then, I 
present how presidents allocate portfolios regarding their importance; in 
other words, who gets what in coalition governments. The point of this 
is to compare portfolio share by party status, whether from the presi-
dent’s party or alternatively other coalition partners, and also by seat 
share in the lower chamber. I then proceed to the testing of hypotheses. 
I initially examine the effect of the importance-weighted share of portfo-
lios on coalition discipline, then test the moderating effect of that portfo-
lio share on the impact of ideological distance on coalition discipline, and 
lastly scrutinize the difference in effect size between various specifica-
tions of importance weight. 
3RUWIROLR,PSRUWDQFH
Are ministries all alike? To answer this question, I present the distribu-
tion of Brazilian ministries according to the policy, office, and budget 
indicators. The analysis below only includes cabinet ministries, thus not 
considering special secretariats located within the presidency. The deci-
sion to exclude such secretariats comes from the fact that most of these 
bodies do not have their own budget or personnel, and for this reason 
are not directly comparable to cabinet ministries. Another justification 
for this choice is that some of these bodies have very specific attribu-
tions, such as handling the president’s communications, acting as the 
secret service, or overseeing institutional relations – for these reasons, 
they lie outside the scope of this article. Analyzing the whole period of 
1999–2014, I present data on 25 different ministries. Figure 1 below 
presents the distribution of Brazilian ministries according to each of the 
variables discussed: policy, office, total budget, and investment budget. 
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The points are the averages for 1999–2014 and the bars, the standard 
deviations.9  
In the policy dimension, the Ministries of Finance, Planning, and 
Justice are the most important ones, while least important are the Minis-
tries of Fishery, Tourism, and Culture. The distribution of the most 
important ones in this dimension shows the so-called political coordina-
tion ministries, and they are usually considered the government’s core. In 
the office dimension, meanwhile, the order slightly alters, with the most 
important ones being the Ministries of Finance, Health, and Justice, 
while least important are the Ministries of Sports, Cities, and Tourism. 
Regarding total budget, most important are the Ministries of Social 
Security, Health, and Defense. These ministries usually control resources 
that are termed rigid; that is, over which political actors do not have the 
political leeway to decide on their allocation. The least important with 
regard to this indicator are once again the Ministries of Fishery, State 
Reform (during its brief existence), and Culture. Still in the budget di-
mension, but now regarding control over the investment budget (which 
corresponds to the discretionary part of the budget, and where geo-
graphically concentrated expenditure originates from such sources as 
voluntary transfers and parliamentary amendments), most important are 
the Ministries of Transport, Cities, and Health and least so the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs, State Reform, and Labor. Two out of the three most 
important ministries in this dimension are ones that typically do not grab 
our attention and that would not be considered relevant a priori. None-
theless they are ministries that are highly valued by parties interested in 
controlling funds that can be allocated for electoral purposes.
 

9  All variables were normalized to vary from zero to one, so as to make the 
comparison of the results easier. Table 6 in the Appendix shows the descriptive 
statistics.  
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±

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6RXUFH $XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSLODWLRQ
Comparing the different dimensions, we see that particular ministries can 
be more or less important across them. However, something to be noted 
is that the standard deviations are not large within the given timeframe. 
This may be interpreted as homogeneity or consistency of ministry im-
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portance over time, and across different governments.10 Given the min-
istries’ distribution presented in Figure 1, we can notice that their im-
portance varies significantly – corroborating the preliminary assumption 
that ministries are not all alike. Table 1 presents the correlation matrix 
between the respective importance indicators. 
7DEOH&RUUHODWLRQ0DWUL[,PSRUWDQFH,QGLFDWRUV
 Policy Office Total 
Budget 
Investment 
Budget 
Policy --- 0.643*** 0.179*** -0.38** 
Office 0.643*** --- 0.437*** -0.05 
Total Budget 0.79*** 0.437*** --- 0.335*** 
Investment Budget -0.138** -0.05 0.335*** --- 
1RWH 7KHVHDUH3HDUVRQFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWVSYDOXHSYDOXH
Table 1 shows that the correlation between the different indicators of 
portfolio importance are not all as high as expected, when ministries are 
all homogenous parts of the cabinet. The highest correlations are be-
tween policy and office (0.643, p-value<0.01) and between office and 
total budget (0.437, p-value<0.01). The correlation between total budget 
and policy is low (0.179, p-value<0.01), and between policy and invest-
ment budget actually negative (-0.138, p-value<0.05). The correlation 
between office and investment budget is not statistically significant  
(-0.05) meanwhile. These results indicate that portfolios control different 
assets, and are important for varying reasons. This is why this infor-
mation must be taken into consideration in portfolio allocation analyses 
of who gets what in the Brazilian political system of coalition presiden-
tialism. 
:KR*HWV:KDW"
Figure 2 presents the relationship between the proportion of ministries 
and that of seats in the legislative, comparing the gain of the president’s 
party with that of the remaining parties in the coalition across each of 
the dimensions of portfolio importance. In this analysis, I consider non-
partisan ministers as being from the president’s party – since their loyalty 
is to the head of state. I first present the policy dimension, then the of-

10  Note that this indicates that portfolio allocation is not completely endogenous 
to the government’s preferences or indeed ministry-led, since it does not vary 
greatly over time. 
  Portfolio Allocation and Coalition Support in Brazil 119 

fice one, and following on both respective indicators for the budget 
dimension. Each point in the graph indicates a party–year observation. 
)LJXUH3RUWIROLR$OORFDWLRQDQG6HDW6KDUH3ROLF\2IILFHDQG%XGJHW
,QGLFDWRUV


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
6RXUFH $XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSLODWLRQ
The president’s party is overcompensated for in three out of the four 
indicators presented in the graphs above. That is, the president’s party 
receives a disproportional gain in relation to its size in the legislative 
when considering the proportion of ministries as weighted by their im-
portance in the policy, office, and total budget dimensions. Only in in-
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vestment budget is distribution more equitable. The concentration of 
ministries within the president’s party is particularly strong regarding the 
policy dimension, where the president controls almost all legislative for-
mulation through their own party – sharing very little with the rest of the 
coalition partners.  
Thus, when one considers the distribution of ministries weighted by 
the assets controlled, the government may be a coalition government but 
the effect of presidentialism is evident in the separating out of the presi-
dent’s party from the other ones in the coalition per their differentiated 
statuses. Another critical aspect in the distribution of ministries is the 
allocation of a significant proportion of them to nonpartisan ministers. 
This can be noticed in the distribution of ministers having zero propor-
tion of seats in the legislative. 
Analyzing the allocation of ministries weighted by the different di-
mensions suggests the following core pattern: the president concentrates 
the ministries that formulate policies within their own party, while more 
equitably distributing among the remaining coalition partners the ones 
that are stronger concerning budget allocation. This pattern may be ex-
plainable by the various incentives that exist for both the president and 
for coalition partners. Regarding the president, the goal is to minimize 
the risk of policy drift – thus concentrating government coordination 
and policy formulation within their party. From the coalition partners’ 
point of view, meanwhile, they can more easily claim credit for geo-
graphically targeted policies than for more diffuse governmental ones 
that would be directly attributable to the president himself/herself. To 
illustrate this pattern more clearly, Table 2 shows the regression models 
with each of the portfolio shares as dependent variables, and the status 
and seat share as the main independent ones. Regressions are linear 
models in a seemingly unrelated regression system.11  
Table 2 reveals that no matter the specification of the dependent 
variable – meaning regardless of the specific weights applied, whether 
policy, office, total budget, or investment budget – coalition partners 
always receive a smaller share in portfolio allocation. This means that the 
president always prioritizes their own party therein, appointing mainly 
co-partisans to control ministries. In sum, coalition governments imply 
some power-sharing – but in presidential systems this power-sharing is 
done while a difference in status between the president’s party and the 
other coalition partners still remains however. Notice that this result is 
observed even when keeping the legislative seat share constant. This 

11  Systemfit command of the “systemfit” R package.  
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means that the parties comprising the coalition are not treated indiscrim-
inately. In theory, coalition parties should be compensated in direct rela-
tionship to their contribution to the coalition concerning seat share. 
However, in the eyes of the president, coalition parties are not all equal – 
and so co-partisan ministers are prioritized. To demonstrate that coali-
tion partner status is the primary predictor, I give in the Appendix the 
same regression models but with this specific variable removed (Table 7). 
The variable of legislative seat share keeps its direction and significance, 
but the R2 are significantly reduced: from 0.566 to 0.063 in the policy-
weighted, from 0.718 to 0.176 in the office-weighted, from 0.11 to 0.305 
in the total budget-weighted, and from 0.339 to 0.271 in the investment 
budget-weighted share. 
7DEOH,PSRUWDQFH:HLJKWHG3RUWIROLR$OORFDWLRQ'HWHUPLQDQWV
 Dependent Variable 
 Policy 
Share 
Office 
Share 
Total 
Budget 
Share 
Investment 
Budget 
Share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coalition Partner Status -0.333*** 
(0.029) 
-0.282*** 
(0.019) 
-0.193*** 
(0.015) 
-0.082*** 
(0.023) 
Seat Share 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Term of Office 0.005 
(0.028) 
-0.002 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.022) 
Time until Election 0.002 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
Popularity 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant 0.253*** 
(0.080) 
0.201*** 
(0.053) 
0.145*** 
(0.042) 
0.081 
(0.064) 
Observations 114 114 114 114 
R2 0.585 0.730 0.724 0.368 
Adjusted R2 0.566 0.718 0.711 0.339 
Residual Std. Error  
(df = 109) 
0.144 0.095 0.076 0.116 
1RWH 7KLV LV D VHHPLQJO\ XQUHODWHG UHJUHVVLRQ V\VWHP 685(VWLPDWHV UHSRUWHG. 
6WDQGDUGHUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVSSS
The results in Table 2 present evidence in support of H1, which states 
that presidents will allocate the largest share of portfolios to co-partisan 
ministers compared to coalition partners. However, to provide a formal 
test of H2 and H3 respectively, we have to compare the magnitude of 
the coefficients provided in Table 2. In the comparison of the absolute 
numbers, the effect of coalition partner status is the largest in the policy-
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weighted share (-0.333) and the smallest in the total budget-weighted (-
0.193) and the investment budget-weighted (-0.082) ones. This provides 
evidence for the five hypotheses being true, since it was expected that 
the effect would be greater in the policy-weighted share of portfolios and 
smaller in the budget-weighted ones. However, to formally test these 
hypotheses, a significance test of the difference between coefficients is 
provided.12 
7DEOH&RPSDULQJWKH(IIHFWRI&RDOLWLRQ3DUWQHU6WDWXVRQ,PSRUWDQFH
:HLJKWHG3RUWIROLR$OORFDWLRQ
 Difference in Coefficients 
Coalition Partner Status 
 Policy Office Total 
Budget 
Investment 
Budget 
Policy ---    
Office 12.938 
(0.000)*** 
---   
Total Budget 45.499 
(0.000)*** 
102.28 
(0.000)*** 
---  
Investments Budget 48.183 
(0.000)*** 
51.742 
(0.000)*** 
22.604 
(0.000)*** 
--- 
1RWH 7KLVLVDOLQHDUK\SRWKHVLVWHVW&KLVWDWLVWLFRID:DOGWHVW3YDOXHLQSDUHQ
WKHVHVSSS
Table 3 provides the significance tests, and furthermore shows that the 
differences in the magnitude of the effect observed in Table 2 are statis-
tically significant. This means that, in fact, the effect of coalition partner 
status is larger in the policy-weighted share and smaller in the two budg-
et-weighted ones. In sum, the president appoints co-partisans to the 
ministries most important to the government’s own policy formulation. 
The Ministries of Finance, Planning, and Justice will almost always be 
headed by a loyal minister, and are very unlikely to go to a coalition part-
ner. This means that the president takes into consideration the im-
portance of the ministry in question when deciding whom to delegate 
these powers to.  
Moving on to the budget indicators, we can see the increased partic-
ipation of coalition partners – since the effect of coalition partner status 
is the smallest in these specifications. This indicates that, when deciding 
who gets what, the president usually shares the ministries that are most 
important concerning the budget dimension more equally with coalition 
partners. Summing up, the president always retains the largest share of 

12  Linear hypothesis test of difference between coefficients. Linear-hypothesis 
command in the “car” R package.  
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portfolios, appointing co-partisan ministers. However this concentration 
is significantly smaller when we consider the budget-weighted portfolio 
shares.  
This shows that portfolios are not all alike, and are furthermore not 
distributed among coalition partners equally. There is a clear division of 
labor, where the president keeps the policy-relevant ministries and shares 
the budget-relevant ones with coalition partners. Given this specific 
pattern of portfolio allocation, how do these circumstances affect legisla-
tive support for the president’s agenda in Congress? That is, how does 
this precise distribution of ministries – considering the different assets 
controlled – affect the legislative behavior of the coalition’s constitutive 
parties within the parliamentary arena?
7KH3RZHU6KDULQJ+\SRWKHVLV3DUW\/HYHO
6XSSRUW
Table 4 presents the results of the effect of portfolio allocation on coali-
tion discipline. The effect analyzed here is the size of the gain for each 
party weighted by the importance of the ministries. The results of the 
models show the positive relationship between portfolio share and coali-
tion discipline. That is, in general, the larger the gain in the executive, the 
greater the support in the legislative arena. This result provides evidence 
in favor of H4, as well as the argument presented in the literature that 
portfolio allocation to coalition partners would be a way to “cement” the 
power-sharing deal and to establish legislative support for the president’s 
agenda. 
However this result is only statically significant when we consider 
the budget-weighted portfolio shares (Table 4, models 3 and 4), and even 
in these models the effect is significant only at the 10 percent level. This 
means that even though the relationship remains positive in all models, 
the positive relationship between portfolio share and party discipline 
might be mainly driven only by the distribution of budget-important 
ministries. The reduced level of significance, and the fact that two of the 
specifications do not show statistical significance, could be an indication 
of a measurement error or of some other problem – considering that the 
strong and positive relationship between portfolio share and legislative 
discipline is posited to be very stable in the literature. To demonstrate 
that this is not the case, Table 8 in the Appendix shows the effect of the 
simple measure of portfolio share (considering only the number of port-
folios allocated) and also includes a measure considering proportionality 
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in allocation (portfolio share as related to seat share). The results show 
that the significance remains at the 10 percent level. 
7DEOH:HLJKWHG3RUWIROLR$OORFDWLRQDQG3DUW\'LVFLSOLQH
 Dependent Variable 
 Party Discipline 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ideological Distance -10.131*** -10.140*** -10.511*** -11.884*** 
 (3.297) (3.273) (3.157) (2.994) 
Policy Share 8.341    
 (5.209)    
Office Share  9.866   
  (5.955)   
Total Budget Share   12.882*  
   (7.196)  
Investment Budget Share    12.752* 
    (6.660) 
Second Term 3.439* 3.416* 3.277* 3.211 
 (1.968) (1.967) (1.971) (1.968) 
Time until Election 4.546*** 4.552*** 4.517*** 4.475*** 
 (0.887) (0.886) (0.884) (0.882) 
Popularity 0.139* 0.143* 0.151** 0.169** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) 
Constant 65.685*** 65.243*** 64.699*** 64.153*** 
 (5.385) (5.388) (5.398) (5.417) 
Observations 95 95 95 95 
R2 0.371 0.372 0.375 0.378 
Adjusted R2 0.335 0.337 0.340 0.343 
Residual Std. Error  
(df = 89) 
9.344 9.335 9.312 9.288 
F Statistic (df = 5; 89) 10.488*** 10.544*** 10.686*** 10.829*** 
1RWH  2/6HVWLPDWHVUHSRUWHG 6WDQGDUGHUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVSS
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These results perhaps indicate that the effect of portfolio share on legis-
lative discipline is smaller and more unstable than usually believed. Also, 
they may show that another factor could be more important to explain-
ing legislative discipline – in this case, ideological distance. Table 4 shows 
that the effect of ideological distance is negative, strong, and stable 
across different specifications. For this reason, I argue that portfolio 
allocation might be a secondary explanation for legislative support. To 
demonstrate this point, model 3 in Table 8 in the Appendix shows that 
the R2 is not notably reduced when we remove portfolio share – mean-
ing that this factor has only a limited effect on coalition discipline. Re-
garding the remaining variables included in the model, the president’s 
popularity increases legislative support. For the time until the next elec-
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tion variable, the greater it is, the more extensive the coalition’s support. 
Counterintuitively, party discipline was demonstrated to be stronger in 
the president’s second term. 
The results presented in Table 4 may suggest evidence for H5 being 
true, since the effect of portfolio share is significant only when we con-
sider the budget-weighted ones. Also speaking in favor of H5 is that the 
R2 of models 3 and 4 in Table 4 are the largest. However, the difference 
is only small. To formally test if there is a statistically significant differ-
ence between the coefficients, I implement the same linear hypothesis 
test between coefficients as presented above. Results are given in Ta-
ble 5. 
7DEOH&RPSDULQJWKH(IIHFWRI&RDOLWLRQ3DUWQHU6WDWXVRQ:HLJKWHG
3RUWIROLR$OORFDWLRQ
 Difference in Coefficients 
Portfolio Share 
 Policy Office Total 
Budget 
Investment 
Budget 
Policy ---    
Office 0.085 
(0.770) 
---   
Total Budget 0.759 
(0.385) 
0.256 
(0.613) 
---  
Investment 
Budget 
0.717 
(0.399) 
0.234 
(0.629) 
0.000 
(0.985) 
--- 
1RWH 7KLVLVDOLQHDUK\SRWKHVLVWHVW)VWDWLVWLFRID)WHVW3YDOXHLQSDUHQWKHVHV  
SSS
H5 states that the effect of the budget-weighted shares on legislative 
support is larger compared to the other effects. This happens because 
coalition partners are more interested in affecting distributive policies, 
and reciprocate for the influence over valuable resources in the legislative 
arena. However the comparison of coefficients does not show statistical-
ly significant differences, indicating that all effect variations are indistin-
guishable from zero. This means that the effect sizes are consistent, and 
can be considered the same across different specifications of the 
weighting of portfolio share. This result is a direct refutation of H5, 
showing that the greater the gain, the larger the support – and also that 
the effect size is the same across different types of gain.  
The nonsignificant results present evidence that coalition parties do 
not react differently in the legislative arena on the basis of the specific 
assets controlled in the executive. The explanation for this result might 
be that coalition partners may be acquiring different assets in the execu-
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tive. However, once in the cabinet, coalition partners provide reasonable 
legislative support to the government. Sharing power does indeed build 
support. This result should not mean that coalition partners are office-
seekers and exclusively motivated solely by getting into the cabinet. Tak-
en together, the results presented here emphasize that preferences mat-
ter. For this reason, the president takes into consideration whom to 
appoint to important ministries; coalition partners, meanwhile, are also 
influenced by the ideological distance from the president and not solely 
by portfolio share.  
&RQFOXVLRQ
I explored here the question of portfolio allocation in coalition presiden-
tialism, focusing mainly on the as yet unsolved problem of the differ-
ences between ministries. Whether in the literature on coalition govern-
ments within parliamentary systems or adapted to the specific context of 
presidentialism, the debate always ends up coming back to the issue that 
not all ministries are alike. How, for example, does one compare the 
Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Sports? 
In many situations, ministries are so different in their attributes, pre-
rogatives, and powers that their direct comparison makes no sense. 
There is debate about classifying ministries into political coordination 
and clientele ones respectively (Abranches 1988), and into more im-
portant ministries – or “core portfolios” (Martínez-Gallardo and Schlei-
ter 2014). However these classifications usually respond to only intuitive 
or unsystematic criteria. If we do not know objectively how ministries 
are to be differentiated, how is it possible to understand portfolio alloca-
tion strategies implemented by the president or moreover to compre-
hend the effects that the specific allocations of these has on the behavior 
of the parties comprising the coalition? 
This article has attempted to bring some fresh answers to these 
longstanding questions, presenting an original measure of portfolio im-
portance based on three objective dimensions of the specific assets con-
trolled: policy, office, and budget. Weighting the proportion of ministries 
allocated to coalition parties with these measures of importance, I have 
strived here to answer two interrelated questions: who gets what, or how 
does the president allocate ministries, and how does this matter, or what 
is the effect of the proportionalities in ministry distribution on coalition 
partners’ subsequent legislative support? 
The results indicate that ministries are distinctly different, and that 
importance varies according to the specific dimension being evaluated. 
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That is, what is an essential ministry in policy formulation may not be 
the most important one in budget allocation meanwhile. This result high-
lights the relevance of asking not only how the ministries differ, but also 
according to which criteria exactly or in which specific dimension they 
do so. This is because an asset valued by one party may not be what is 
esteemed by another. 
The results indicate that the president prioritizes their party when 
distributing ministries. The presented evidence has shown that the presi-
dent allocates the largest share of portfolios to co-partisan ministers in all 
four specifications of the importance-weighted measures – policy, office, 
total budget, and investment budget. However the comparison of the 
specific attributes of the ministries and the effect of co-partisanship on 
portfolio allocation across different dimensions of importance has re-
vealed that the president primarily concentrates on the ministries deemed 
most crucial when considering the issue of policy relevance, and is more 
willing to hand over the budget-relevant ones meanwhile. For this reason 
it can be concluded that power-sharing is limited within presidential 
systems, with the president’s party keeping control over the most im-
portant ministries concerning policy formulation and building a coalition 
by sharing the budget-important ones with coalition partners.  
The findings here also divulge that the larger the gain in the execu-
tive when it comes to the proportion of ministries controlled, the greater 
coalition partners’ legislative support. This result is consistent across all 
specifications of the gain made in the executive. However this effect is 
only statistically significant when considering the budget-weighted share. 
Nevertheless, when comparing the different importance-weighted shares, 
the results do not show variation between respective gains. This means 
that when it comes to coalition discipline, the effect on legislative sup-
port stays the same.  
Taken together, the answers uncovered to the two research ques-
tions may be evidence of a possible coalition presidentialism dilemma. 
This is because at the portfolio-allocation stage of the game, the presi-
dent takes into consideration the risk of policy drift and thus apportions 
more ministries to their co-partisans. However, when analyzing the ex-
planatory factors for legislative support from coalition partners, it was 
found that portfolio allocation serves as an instrument to induce such 
support – even if only limitedly so. Consequently, while the president has 
incentives to concentrate ministries with close partners, that strategy may 
have negative effects on the legislative stage of the game – as the parties 
receiving little reward begin to vote against the government’s various 
positions. There is a fine balance that the president must strike to make 
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coalition presidentialism work: allocating ministries in a way that builds 
legislative support while at the same time minimizing the risk of being 
undermined by their coalition partners.
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Quem Ganha o Quê e Como isso Importa? Alocação de Minis-
térios Ponderada pela Importância e o Apoio da Coalizão no Brasil 
Resumo: Quem ganha o quê na alocação de ministérios e como isso 
importa para o apoio legislativo dos parceiros da coalizão em sistemas 
presidencialistas? Proponho que os ministérios não são todos iguais e 
que sua alocação, bem como o apoio à agenda do presidente, depende da 
distribuição específica de ativos dentro do executivo. A proporção de 
ministérios alocada aos partidos da coalizão é ponderada por uma 
medida de importância baseada nos ativos controlados pelo ministério 
em questão, tais como políticas, cargos e orçamento. Uma vez que a 
alocação ponderada dos ministérios foi identificada, os resultados 
mostram que: 1) o presidente concentra os ministérios mais importantes 
em seu próprio partido, principalmente considerando a dimensão de 
políticas; 2) mantém-se a relação positiva entre alocação de ministérios e 
apoio legislativo, mesmo considerando a importância de dimensões 
específicas; e 3) os parceiros de coalizão não respondem de maneira 
diferente em termos de apoio legislativo, tendo em vista a distribuição 
dos diferentes ativos na alocação de ministérios. 
Palavras-Chave: Brasil, sistemas presidencialistas, coalizões, alocação de 
ministérios, ranking de gabinetes, coesão legislative 
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$SSHQGL[
7DEOH3RUWIROLR:HLJKWHG,PSRUWDQFH'HVFULSWLYH6WDWLVWLFV
 Min Max Mean SD N 
Policy 0 1 0.13 0.17 428 
Office 0 1 0.27 0.22 360 
Total Budget 0 1 0.47 0.21 424 
Investment Budget 0 1 0.11 0.17 424 
1RWH 2EVHUYDWLRQVDUHSHUPLQLVWU\\HDU0LVVLQJYDOXHVLQWKH³RIILFH´YDULDEOHGXH
WR ODFN RI GDWD RQ SROLWLFDO DSSRLQWHHV GXULQJ )HUQDQGR +HQULTXH &DUGRVR¶V
ILUVWDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ±
7DEOH:HLJKWHG3RUWIROLR$OORFDWLRQ'HWHUPLQDQWV
 Dependent Variable 
 Policy 
Share 
Office 
Share 
Total 
Budget 
Share 
Investment 
Budget 
Share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Seat Share 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Term 0.028 
(0.041) 
0.016 
(0.031) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
0.024 
(0.023) 
Time until Election -0.005 
(0.018) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Popularity -0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant 0.0471 
(0.115) 
0.027 
(0.088) 
0.026 
(0.064) 
0.030 
(0.066) 
Observations 114 114 114 114 
R2 0.096 0.205 0.330 0.297 
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.176 0.305 0.271 
Residual Std. Error  
(df = 109) 
0.212 0.163 0.118 0.121 
1RWH 7KLV LV D VHHPLQJO\ XQUHODWHG UHJUHVVLRQ V\VWHP 2/6 HVWLPDWHV UHSRUWHG. 
6WDQGDUGHUURUVLQSDUHQWKHVHV SS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7DEOH3RUWIROLR$OORFDWLRQDQG&RDOLWLRQ'LVFLSOLQH
 Dependent Variable 
 Discipline 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ideological Distance -10.181*** -7.202** -12.306*** 
 (3.185) (2.796) (3.030) 
Total Share 15.788*   
 (8.244)   
Proportional Share  4.412*  
  (2.245)  
Term 3.258 5.359*** 3.862* 
 (1.964) (1.480) (1.967) 
Time until Election 4.523*** 4.410*** 4.536*** 
 (0.882) (0.672) (0.895) 
Popularity 0.148** 0.036 0.157** 
 (0.074) (0.061) (0.075) 
Constant 64.503*** 66.306*** 65.754*** 
 (5.392) (4.257) (5.431) 
Observations 95 95 95 
R2 0.378 0.481 0.353 
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.452 0.324 
Residual Std. Error 9.288  
(df = 89) 
7.040  
(df = 89) 
9.425  
(df = 90) 
F Statistic 10.829***  
(df = 5; 89) 
16.341*** 
(df = 5; 89) 
12.256***  
(df = 4; 90) 
1RWH 2/6HVWLPDWHV UHSRUWHG6WDQGDUGHUURUV LQSDUHQWKHVHV S 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